Epistemology

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By William P. Alston

The most vital Anglo-American philosophers of our time right here joins the present philosophical debate concerning the nature of fact. William P. Alston formulates and defends a realist belief of fact, which he calls alethic realism (from "aletheia," Greek for "truth"). this concept holds that the reality worth of an announcement (belief or proposition) is determined by even if what the assertion is set is because the assertion says it truly is. Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam are of the widespread and broadly influential modern philosophers whose anti-realist principles Alston assaults.

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Even the Kantian 'idea,' which was to playa crucial role in the further development of Cohen's idealism, was only treated in its negative sense in the first edition of Kants Theone der Erfahrung. "The result of the Transcendental Aesthetic was the noumenon as a limiting concept. ' Something similar can be said of the Transcendental Logic: the theory of the categories is at the same time the theory of ideas in the negative sense" (KlE' 269). It is certainly not by chance that one of the most important additions Cohen made to the second edition of Kants Theone der Erfahrung was precisely the development of the role and meaning of the idea.

Plato's starting point was the fundamental requirement of "skeptical idealism" (S I: 343) (or perhaps it would be better to use the term critical idealism), that is, the problem of error, which any critical theory of true being must face: "How can it come about that the Eleatic being, the validity of Duma should suit this Socratic elOD;, this thought, defined YEVOr,," while sensible phenomena become and change, as Heraclitus showed in his teaching on the cosmos? " (S I: 343). In Plato's theory of ideas this "critical constituent feature" (SI: 344) is at the same time a further investigation of the Socratic theory of concept and a decisive step forward.

The a priori is not justified up to the point of being left with its originative metaphysical meaning, and even less so in its psychological meaning. " Cohen accused Meyer of having reduced the transcendental to the psychological, following the lead of Fries (cf. KTEI 123). Transcendental logic is not only an "unusual name" with which Kant "baptized" empirico-psychological induction: 56 "No! It is not simply the 'unusual name,' but it is the unprecedented thing which was born under that name: that the forms found in empirical thought are not simply psychological categories, but the gnoseological conditions (erkenntniss-theoretisch) of the possibility of experience" (KTE 1 124).

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